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Secondary predicates in Russian are in the instrumental case (INST), or they agree in 
case (AGR) with their controlling argument in the main clause. The selection of case 
morphology depends on a complex interaction of a number of factors . 1 Here, the 
focus is only on semantic factors that have direct theoretical implications for the 
individual-level predicate (ILP) vs. stage-level predicate (SLP) distinction. I analyze 
the semantic constraints on ILPs used as depictives, situation anchors, and restrictors 
in sentences expressing quantification over situations, that is, in contexts in which they 
appear to have SL interpretations. I will advance three main claims: First ,  ILPs in 
Russian do not here undergo a shift into SLPs, but rather retain their inherent IL 
status. Second, case morphology on Russian predicates does not encode the IL and 
SL status of predicates. Third, the ILP-SLP distinction cannot be temporally-based, 
as Carlson ( 1977) originally proposed. My exploration of this topic involves the 
interactions among morphological case, the situation-related structure and the 
quantificational structure of sentences. 
1. Data and Main Questions 
Semantic effects of the INST-AGR alternation on depictives can be illustrated by pairs 
like those in ( la,b) (from Nichols 198 1 ,  p. 156, including her judgements) . 
( 1 )  a .  Milicija privelaP egoi domoj pjanogoi I *ruanymi . 
police brought him.ACC home drunk.ACC I *drunkINST 
'The police brought him home drunk. ' 
b .  Druz'ja priveliP egoi domoj , #pjanogoi I ruanymi . 
friends brought him.ACC home drunkACC I drunkINST 
'His friends brought him home drunk' 
In ( la,b) the depictive 'drunk' characterizes the individual denoted by the controlling 
DO-argument in relation to the situation time of the main predicate: i .e . ,  he was drunk 
at the time when he was brought home. In ( la),  the depictive pjanogo agrees in the 
accusative case with its controlling DO-argument 'him' , while in ( lb) the depictive is 
in the INST case pjanym and entails a change, namely that 'he'  went from a state of 
sobriety to drunkenness before being brought home (see Nichols 1 98 1 ,  p. 1 56 ,  252).  
In contrast, (la) carries no suggestion of a change. 
The SLP 'drunk' is of the appropriate semantic type to satisfy the basic 
semantic constraint on depictives that they express a (potentially) transitory property of 
their host argument in the main clause. (For the origins of this constraint see Bresnan 
1982, Rothstein 1983 ,  Section 5 . 1 ,  and references therein.) Intuitively, a depictive 
temporally contains, and thus temporally locates, the situation time of a main predicate. 
SLPs are ideal depictives, because they denote sets of temporally and spatially 
bounded stages of individuals (Carlson 1 977). ILPs are often odd or excluded as 
depictives, because they describe properties that hold atemporally (or at any time) of 
their arguments (Carlson 1977). Hence, asserting that the situation time of an ILP 
depictive contains the situation time of the main predicate is always true, which means 
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that it is utterly uninformative (see also Stump 1 985,  Ch. VI. 2 .2 . 1 .  for similar 
observations):  cpo Ivan worked blue-eyed. 
However, ILPs can function as depictives, provided the main clause supports a 
reading of an ILP depictive as involving a change with respect to the property that the 
ILP depictive describes (see McNally 1 993, and Section 3 .2.  below). In Russian, this 
interpretation must be overtly encoded by the INST case on ILPs used as depictives. 
As (2) shows, only the INST -form of the nominal ILP 'murderer' is sanctioned, but 
not the AGR-form, here NOM. (2) is most naturally taken to mean that something 
must have happened in the room to make him a murderer. The particular type of a 
change is indeterminate; depending on the context, he may have murdered somebody, 
been convicted a murderer, etc . 
(2) Oni vyset iz komnaty *ubijcai / ubijceii . 
he.NOM left from room *murderer.NOM / murderer.INST 
'He left the room a murderer. ' 
Secondary predicates used as, what I call, ' situation anchors' specify a single 
situation in which one or more occurrences of a situation of the type described by the 
main predicate holds. Situation anchors roughly correspond to ordinary temporal 
when-clauses or temporal as-clauses. For example, in (3a), taken from Nichols 
( 198 1 ,  p.42), the SLP 'sleeping' delimits a single situation in which 'he could not 
forget about it' holds (under one of the readings of (3a» . 
(3) a .  Oni i spjasciji / ?spjascimi ne mog ob etom zabyt'P. 
he.NOM even sleeping.NoM / ?sleeping.INST NEG could about it forget 
'He couldn't  forget about it, even when he was sleeping. ' 
b .  *Golodnyji / goIodnymi oni vozvraScalsja'I domoj . 
*hungry.NOM / hungry.INST he returned home 
, When( ever) he was hungry, he returned home. ' 
Secondary predicates can also form the restrictive clause of various sentential 
operators : e.g. , iterative, generic, deontic, epistemic, and counterfactual, for example. 
In (3b) , the SLP 'hungry' serves as a restrictor of an implicit (phonologically null) 
generic operator. (3b) can be then paraphrased as 'Generally, if there was a situation 
of him being hungry, he returned home in such a situation . '  Secondary predicates as 
restrictors in sentences with generic quantification roughly correspond to atemporal 
when-clauses (Carlson 1979), restrictive if/when-clauses (Farkas and Sugioka 1984), 
or restrictive as-clauses in English (Katz 1993). Notice that SLPs used as situation 
anchors preferably agree with their host argument (3a), while SLPs used as restrictors 
must be in the INST case (3b). 
In Russian, ILPs may also function as situation anchors and restrictors, 
provided they are in the INST case, as is shown in (4) . (4)/(i) illustrates the situation 
anchor reading of nominal ILPs:  'Teacher' here delimits a single situation in which 'he 
was often ill ' holds, and hence it appears to be of a SL type. 
(4) *Ucitel" / ucitelem' on ' -- 1 1 �1 casto 
*teacher.NOM / teacher.INST he.NOM often be.ill.p AST 
(i) 'When he was a teacher, he was often ill. ' / 'As a teacher, .. . ' 
(ii) 'He was often ill if/when(ever) he was a teacher. ' / 'As a teacher, . .  . ' 
ILPs may also serve as restrictors of quantificational operators. The 
interpretation of (4) may involve an implicit generic quantifier, whereby the ILP 
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'teacher' contributes the restrictive clause for the sentential quantification over 
situations. The meaning of (4) then corresponds to the translation in (4)/(ii) , and it can 
be paraphrased as 'Generally, if there was a situation of him being a teacher, he was 
often ill in such a situation. ' The observation that ILPs can be interpreted as forming 
the restrictive clause in sentential quantification over situations, rather than individuals, 
has so far not been given enough attention in quantificational studies. It represents an 
atypical case from the point of view of the prototypical expression of quantification 
and quantificational ontology, as discussed by Partee ( 1 99 1 a) .  If  the domain of 
quantification involves situations, the main sortal predicate for the relevant 
quantificational operator is typically provided by a SLP, and not an ILP. 
Table I summarizes the data presented so far. (Nominal) ILPs are restricted to 
occur in the INST case in all their uses as secondary predicates, while SLPs require 
the INST case only if they are used as restrictors of quantifiers. 
Table I :  AGR-INST alternation on secondary predicates 
deDictives situation anchors restrictors 
AGR INST AGR INST AGR INST 
SLP � ?/� � ?/� * � 
ILP (nominal) * � * � * � 
The main questions I pose are as follows: 
1 .  How do we motivate the observation that ILPs in the INST case occur in contexts 
in which SLPs are typically expected, namely, as depictives, situation anchors and 
restrictors? 
2. Why do SLPs used as restrictors require the INST case, but when used as 
depictives and situation anchors they do not require it? 
3. What does the behavior of ILPs in the INST case, which appear to have SL 
properties, tell us about the nature of the ILP-SLP distinction? 
2. The Semantics of the Instrumental-Agreement Alternation 
2. 1 .  Cases as Overt Exponents of the IL and SL Status of Predicates 
It might be tempting to propose that a combination of an ILP and the INST case is a 
SLP, and therefore it is not surprising to fmd ILPs in the INST case in contexts in 
which SLPs freely occur. In fact, a proposal along these lines exists . Let me call it 
the 'Null-Hypothesis ' ,  and state it in the most general terms in (5) :  
(5) Null-Hypothesis: In Russian, the semantic type of a (nominal or an adjectival) 
predicate is formally marked by case morphology. A predicate describes 
(a) a permanent property, if(f) it is in the AGR case, and therefore it is an ILP; 
(b) a temporary property, if(f) it is in the INST case, and therefore it is a SLP. 
The Null-Hypothesis says that all case-marked predicates in Russian are either ILPs or 
SLPs. Among those who most recently subscribe to it, albeit only with respect to 
primary predicates, are Geist ( 1 999) , Pereltsvaig ( 1999), and Becker (2000) who 
applies it in acquisition studies. The Null-Hypothesis has its roots in traditional 
descriptive and reference grammars, where INST -predicates are characterized as 
describing properties that are temporally limited, transitory, episodic, changeable, 
accidental, inessential, or locatable in time and space. In contrast, AGR-predicates are 
taken to have a stative meaning and to express a descriptive background for other 
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events, or used for properties that are pennanent, essential, and independent of 
particular time points and locations. Timberlake ( 1982, p.323ff.) ,  who only discusses 
examples with predicative nouns, observes that INST is preferred, if some temporal or 
also modal limitation is imposed on the property described by a nominal predicate. 
The Null-Hypothesis given in (5) is compatible with the idea that nominal and 
adjectival predicates are classified as ILPs or SLPs not in the lexicon, but rather after 
the postlexical case assignment to them (see Geist 1 999, p . 1 8) .  Another way of 
implementing the Null-Hypothesis would be to treat morphological cases as overt 
markers of coercion functions that induce shifts between ILPs and SLPs. In English, 
the coercion mechanism is often evoked for situations in which inherent ILPs are 
felicitously used in contexts that license SLPs, for example (e .g . ,  Kratzer 1 989, 
1995). On this view, the Russian INST case could be semantically characterized as a 
function that coerces inherent ILPs into SLPs, and the AGR cases as functions that 
map inherent SLPs into ILPs. 
One of the goals of this paper is to establish that the Null-Hypothesis given in 
(5) is wrong, regardless in which way it may be implemented. The claim that INST­
predicates are uniformly SLPs is clearly invalidated by the standard diagnostic tests for 
SLPs proposed by Carlson ( 1977) and ( 1 982) . He observes that temporary 
interpretations of ILPs that are intended to hold at particular time points and locations 
are generally impossible or at least odd (6a,c), while SLPs are perfectly acceptable 
when interpreted in this way (6b,d) . (Examples in (6) are taken from Kratzer ( 1 995, 
p. 1 28 ,  see also 1 989) and slightly modified.) We observe the same differential 
behavior of Russian ILPs and SLPs with respect to locative and time-point adverbials, 
as examples in (7) show. In (7a) 'hungry' in the NOM case is compatible with the 
modifiers at seven o 'clock and in the garden, which means that it behaves like a SLP, 
and not an ILP, contrary to the Null-Hypothesis given in (5). In (7b) 'teacher' in the 
INST case is odd with these modifiers, which indicates that it behaves like an ILP, and 
not a SLP, contrary to (5). 
(6) a. ?Manon is a dancer on the lawn. c .  ?Manon is a dancer at 7pm. 
b .  Manon is dancing on the lawn. d .  Manon is dancing at 7pm. 
(7) a. �i byl goIodnyji / golodnymi v sem c asov / v sadu. 
Boris.NOM was hungry.NOM / hungry.INST at seven o'clock / in garden 
'Boris was hungry at seven o'clock / in the garden. '  
b .  Borisi byl ucitel'i / ucitelemi ?v sem c asov / ?v sadu. 
Boris .NOM was teacher. NOM / teacher.INST ?at seven 0' clock / ?in garden 
'Boris was a teacher nat seven o'clock / nin the garden. '  
The Null-Hypothesis would also make the wrong predictions for the behavior 
of secondary predicates. For example, if we also assume the SLP constraint on 
depictives (see Section 1 . , ex. ( l a,b» , it would follow that only predicates in the 
INST case are licensed as depictives, because all and only predicates in the INST case 
are SLPs, whereas predicates in the AGR cases ought to be excluded, because they are 
uniformly ILPs. However, this is contradicted by examples in (8a) and (8b), taken 
from Hinterholzl (2000) and Nichols ( 1 98 1 ,  p .84) , respectively. (8a) with the 
depictive 'intelligent' in INST is odd, but with 'well-educated' also in INST it is well­
fonned. (8b) is well-fonned, although its depictive 'wrapped' occurs in the NOM 
case, the AGR case. (9) is odd, due to the incompatibility of the depictive 'child' with 
the time-point and locative modifiers, which indicates that 'child' retains its inherent IL 
status even though it is in INST. This again contradicts the Null-Hypothesis given in 
(5). However, it is correctly predicted by (5) that hi vstretil �j rebenkomilj - 'I met 
him when lIhe was a child<INST>' on its own is well-fonned, because the depictive 
'child' in INST is a SLP, according to (5). 
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(8) a. Oni vyselP . iz universiteta ??umnymi / xoroso obrazovannymi. 
he.NOM left from university ??intelligent.INST / well-educated.INST 
'He came out of the university ??intelligent / well-educated. ' 
b .  Syri leialI zavernutyji v bumagu. 
cheese.NOM lay wrapped.NoM in paper 
'The cheese lay wrapped in paper. ' 
(9) Jai vstretilP egoj ?rebenkomi/j / pjanymi/j v sem casov / v sadu. 
I.NOM met him.ACC ?child.INST / drunk.INST at seven o'clock / in garden 
'I met him when I1he was ?a child / drunk at seven 0' clock / in the garden. '  
To summarize, examples in (7) and (9) show that time-point and locative 
modifiers interact with the inherent IL and SL status of predicates and not their 
morphological case form. Crucially, SLPs in the NOM-case retain their SLP status 
and ILPs in the INST-case retain their ILP status. We obtain the same results with 
respect to other diagnostic tests for the ILP-SLP distinction proposed by Carlson 
( 1977, 1 982), to the extent that they are applicable to Russian. (8a) shows that 
morphological case is insufficient as a predictor of the acceptability of ILPs as 
depictives. Although I cannot provide further evidence, due to the space limitation, 
this ought be sufficient for concluding that morphological cases in Russian do not 
determine the IL and SL status of predicates, and therefore the Null-Hypothesis given 
in (5) must be rejected. 
In addition, the Null-Hypothesis is problematic on general theoretical grounds. 
Although it might appear compelling without a detailed scrutiny, it has wide-reaching 
undesirable consequences for the ILP-SLP distinction and the parts of grammar where 
this distinction is relevant. For example, one area regards quantification and the N-V 
distinction. In Russian, argument positions can be filled by quantified DPs in the 
INST case (e.g . , fa vstretilas '  s kaidoj devockoj - ' I  met every girl ' ) .  Generally, 
quantifiers that syntactically appear inside DPs in argument positions do not behave 
like adverbial quantifiers, therefore, we do not expect SLPs, but rather ILPs, to form 
the range of a quantifier, where the head nominal ILP is the principal sortal predicate. 
Quantified DPs are a natural locus of quantification over individuals. This means that 
if we wanted to uphold the Null-Hypothesis , we would want to restrict the claim that 
nominal ILPs in the INST case are SLPs only to nouns used as predicates, but not as 
arguments. This move would effectively split Russian nouns into ILPs and SLPs , 
either in the lexicon or postlexically. But this would raise the question about the basic 
N-V distinction in Russian, and whether it significantly differs from the N-V 
distinction in English, where nouns are taken to be ILPs (both as arguments and 
predicates) and most verbs are SLPs, as Carlson ( 1977) original proposed. We may 
also want to ask whether there are other languages in which the ILP-SLP distinction is 
encoded by cases on nouns and if so, try to formulate cross-linguistic generalizations 
in this domain. 
2.2. Proposal: Independence of Cases and IL-SL Type of Predicates 
( 10) a .  In Russian, the IL or SL type of predicates is not formally encoded by case 
morphology. 
b .  The INST case is the marked form in the INST-AGR alternation on 
predicates, and it contributes the meaning of a 'change' with respect to the 
property described by the predicate to which it is applied. This is understood as 
meaning that INST denotes a set of pairs of situations < S1 'S2>' such that (i) the 
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truth of pes) entails the falsity of P(s;J, and vice versa; (ii) the running time of 
(s/) strictly precedes the running time of (S2). 
c .  The AGR case is unmarked, which means 'not necesssarily ' conveying the 
meaning component of a 'change' .  
The idea that INST i s  the marked case in the INST-AGR alternation on predicates is 
mainly based on Jakobson ( 1936/ 197 1 ) .  I will argue that the semantics of the INST­
AGR alternation on predicates is orthogonal to the ILP-SLP distinction. In particular, 
the temporal notion of a 'change' is logically compatible with both SLPs and ILPs, 
because it can co-occur with both types of predicates (see also Fernald 1 99412000). It 
is also logically independent of both SLPs and ILPs, because it need not co-occur with 
either of them. 
3. Case and Secondary Predication 
First, I will apply the core proposal given in ( 10) to the easiest cases, namely, to 
sentences with SLP depictives. Then I will discuss the more complicated examples of 
ILP depictives. Finally, I will show how my analysis extends to the uses of 
secondary predicates as situation anchors and restrictors on quantifier domains. 
3 . 1 .  SLP Depictives 
As far as the semantic analysis of depictives is concerned, I assume Rothstein' s  (2000) 
proposal,  which in a slightly modified version is given in ( 1 1 ) :  
( 1 1 )  The situation described by the main clause (Sl) must be  PART-OF the 
situation introduced by the secondary predicate (S2) .  The PART-OF relation is 
characterized as follows: 
a. Temporal dependency constraint: The situation time of Sl is temporally 
contained in the situation time of S2: 't(Sl) ;S 't(S2) .  
b .  Shared grammatical argument constraint: sland S2 share a participant. 
The temporal dependency constraint in ( 1 1 a) licenses the relation between the main 
predicate and depictive through the situation argument of the two predicates. Rothstein 
treats the depictive predication as involving an operation that sums the denotation of 
the main and the secondary predicate. (For the summing operation see Lasersohn 
1992.) This presupposes that the domain of situations has a mereological structure 
that is (partially) ordered by the part relation ' ;s ' : 'v'X,YE U[X�y f-+ xEBy = y] , where 
' EB '  is a binary sum operation. (See Bach 1 98 1 ,  1 986, Krifka 1 986, 1 992, 1 998 ,  
Lasersohn 1 992.) The situation variable s ranges over situations, and the domain of 
situations S is a union of the set S of states, the set P of processes and the set E of 
events: S = SuPuE. The temporal trace function 'C' assigns to each situation s the time 
t that s takes up, such that 'v's,s ' ['t(sEBs ' )  = 't(s)EB't(s ' )] . (For any two situations s and 
s " the sum of their temporal traces equals the temporal trace assigned to the sum of 
these situations (additivity), provided the two situations do not temporally overlap: 
'v' s , s '.., ['t(s)®'t(s ' )] . ' <8> '  is the overlap relation: 'v'x,y,zE U[x<8>Y f-+ 3 zE U[Z�X 1\ 
z�y]] .  For the above definitions see also Krifka 1 992 and 1998.) 
On my analysis it is expected that SL depictives will alternate between AGR 
and INST case forms, because inherent SLPs retain their SL property in all case 
forms, as I have argued in Section 2 . 1 .  The selection of the appropriate case is 
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governed by the general semantic properties of cases on predicates, as proposed in 
(lOb,c). For example, in ( 12) the INST-depictive 'drunk' is used to convey that the 
individual denoted by its controlling subject argument became drunk, while the 
AGRINOM-depictive 'drunk' is unmarked in this respect, and it may describe a stage 
of being drunk. Since the stage of being drunk is temporally and causally closely 
related to the change from sobriety to drunkenness, native speakers do not here 
perceive a significant difference between the semantic contributions of the AGRINOM 
and the INST forms of the depictive, and the two forms alternate without affecting the 
well-formedness of the whole sentence. 
( 12) Oni zenilsjaPII na nej P.UmY.ii / pjanymi · 
he.NOM married on her drunk.NOM / drunk.INST 
'He married her (having gotten) drunk. ' 
HinterhOlzl 2000 
More intriguing are examples in which native speakers perceive a clear 
difference between the contributions of the INST or AGR depictives, or in which 
either the INST-depictive or the AGR-depictive is strongly preferred, or even the only 
possible form. Following Nichols ' ( 1 98 1 ,  p. 1 56, 252) comments, our initial example 
( 1  b) differs from ( 1a) in entailing a change with respect to the property described by 
the depictive 'drunk' . ( 1 a) and ( 1b) can be assigned the logical forms given in ( 1 3a) 
and ( 1 3b), respectively. In ( 1 3b) the meaning of 'change' contributed by the INST 
case to the SLP 'drunk' is represented in terms of a reversal of the truth of the 
predicate: ...,drunk(he,s2) 1\ drunk(he ,s3) .  
( 1 3) a .  3 s3s 13s2[s=S1EBs2 1\ bring-home(friends, he, S 1 )  1\ drunk(he, S2) 
1\ 't(S1) :S 't(S2)] 
b .  3s3s 13s23 s3 [S=S1EBs3 1\ bring-home(friends, he, S1) 
1\ [...,drunk(he ,s2) 1\ drunk(he ,s3) 1\ BEFORE«'t(S2) ,'t(s3» ]  1\ 't(S1) :S 't(S3)] 
In general, I propose that INST is a modifier of predicates (and their arguments) that 
denotes a set of pairs of situations, as specified in ( 14) :  
( 14) INST denotes a set of  pairs of  situations <S 1  ,S2>' such that (i) the truth of P(S1) entails the falsity of P(S2) ' and vice versa; 
(ii) 't(S1) strictly precedes 't(S2) :  BEFORE« 't(S1),'t(s2» .  
I assume that logical operators like negation and various adverbial modifiers introduce 
operations over situation descriptions, where an atomic situation description is a verbal 
predicate with all its argument positions filled by variables or constants (see also de 
Swart 1998). Since the denotation of INST is characterized in terms of the 
information about two distinct situations at two non-overlapping successive intervals, 
the semantics of INST as a predicate modifier is inherently temporal. The transition 
between 81 and 82 takes place before or after the situation time of the main predicate. 
For example, in our initial example ( 1b) 'His friends brought him home drunk, ' the 
transition from sobriety to drunkenness is located before the time when he is brought 
home. In ( 1 5) ,  the INST case on 'happy' triggers the conversational implicature that 
Boris stopped being cheerful at some point after his birth, that is, the relevant 
transition is located after the situation time of the main predicate. 
( 1 5) Boris urodilsjaP ?veselyj / veselym (i umer 
Boris was.born ?happy.NOM / happy.INST(and died 
'Boris was born happy (and he also died happy) . '  
toze veselym). 
also happy.INST) 
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This is a matter of conversational implicature, because ( 1 5) can be continued with " . . .  
and he also died happy" without a contradiction. Whether the change is located before 
or after the situation time established by the main predicate depends on the person, 
time and place deixis inherent in the main sentence' s  constituents, and on our general 
world knowledge associated with the proposition expressed, for example. 
An AGR-case on a SLP depictive is obligatory, if the main clause has a 
progressive reading, as in ( 16) ,  which is taken from Nichols ( 1 98 1 ,  p.25 1 ) :  
( 16) VidisI - Ivani spie odetyji / ??odetymi 
see - Ivan.NOM sleeps dressed.NOM / ??dressed.INST 
'See, I van is sleeping dressed. ' 
In ( 16) ,  the speaker intends to convey that the situation time of the main imperfective 
predicate and depictive are simultaneous and both situations are on-going at the speech 
time. On my analysis, it is predicted that the INST case must be excluded on the 
depictive in ( 16), because the evaluation time of ( 1 6) is restricted to the single present 
situation of the utterance, but the evaluation of the INST -predicate requires access to 
information about two successive non-overlapping situations, as stated in ( 14) above. 
INST on SLP depictives is less frequent than AGR, which can be taken to 
support the proposal thatINST is marked in the INST-AGR alternation on predicates 
(see ( 10))? A depictive must occur in the INST case if the main clause has an iterative 
or a generic/habitual reading, as ( 17) shows. 
( 17) Ivani vsegda spie ??odetyji / odetymi . 
Ivan.NOM always sleeps ??dressed.NOM / dressed.INST 
'I van always sleeps dressed. ' 
ALWAYS s [IN(Ivan,s) A sleeps(Ivan,s)] [dressed(Ivan,s)] 
In ( 17) the generic reading is enforced by the adverb of quantification vsegda 
' always ' ,  which is the main operator in the tripartite representation that binds all the 
free occurrences of the variable s in the formula. ( 17) is true iff all the situations in 
which Ivan sleeps satisfying the restrictive clause are also situations in which Ivan is 
dressed. Following Katz ( 1993),  Chierchia ( 1995), Krifka et al. ( 1 995) ,  I use the 
predicate 'IN' for a maximally general locative relation that relates stages of individuals 
to situations in which they participate. 
It has been observed by many (see Nichols 198 1 ,  p. 279, Timberlake 1 982, p .  
325 , HinterhOlzl 2000, for example) that predicates in generic/habitual or iterative 
sentences must occur in the INST case. On my account, this may be puzzling, given 
that SLPs retain their SL status in all case forms, and therefore always come with a 
situation argument that provides the variable to be bound by the relevant operator in 
sentential quantification over situations, as in ( 17) .  From this point of view, AGR­
SLPs and INST -SLPs are equally well-suited here, and yet in ( 17) only the INST -SLP 
is sanctioned. Intuitively, in ( 17) the property of being dressed intermittently holds of 
Ivan. This suggests the following analysis :  Iterative (twice, several times) and generic 
(always, often) quantifiers can be used with predicates that have an atomic (or discrete) 
structure, or can be interpreted as such (cp. the process-to-event coercion in John sang 
three times last night). AGR-SLPs are excluded in iterative and generic contexts, 
because their denotation domain is non-atomic, and therefore they cannot directly serve 
to form the basis of quantification for iterative and generic quantifiers. The INST 
case, which denotes a set of pairs of situations (see ( 14)) ,  one in which the property 
described by the predicate to which INST is attached holds and one in which it does 
not, generates a fluctuation in truth-value over the evaluation time of a given INST­
SLP. This gives rise to a type of 'interruptive' interpretation, and hence also to the 
requisite multiplicity of discrete (atomic) situations to be quantified over by the generic 
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quantifier 'always' .  This also means that the generic operator quantifies over sets of 
pairs of situations, and not just over situations. 
Notice also that sentences with depictives like ( 1 7) pose the following puzzle 
for the mappings between syntactic and tripartite logical representations. In the logical 
representation of ( 17) the depictive 'dressed' ,  which originates higher in the tree than 
VP, if it is analyzed as an adjunct, forms the nuclear scope, while the main predicate 
' sleep' in the VP contributes to the restriction (see also Krifka et a1. 1995 , p.43). This 
is problematic, if we assume Diesing' s  Mapping Hypothesis ( 1 992, p. 15  and 
elsewhere) that the material from VP is mapped into the nuclear scope and the material 
from IP into a restrictive clause. Interestingly, a similar problem seems to arise for 
postverbal adverbs and adjunct PPs in middle sentences,  as in Bread cuts easily, These 
flowers grow in sandy soil (see Condoravdi 1989), and for adjective modifiers with 
non-intersective readings, as in Olga is a beautiful dancer meaning 'Olga is beautiful as 
a dancer' or 'Olga dances beautifully. '  (For a discussion see Larson 1998.) 
3.2. ILP Depictives 
3.2. 1 .  ILP Depictives and the Licensing Role of the Meaning of 'Change of State ' 
McNally ( 1993) argues that an ILP can function as a depictive if the main clause 
supports a conversational implicature that the individual denoted by its host argument 
undergoes a change with respect to the property described by the depictive. For 
example, the ILP intelligent in ( 1 8) is infelicitous,  unless we imagine a very unlikely 
situation in which Fleisher switches his mental capacities on and off in some unusual 
way. In the most likely situation in which Fleisher has the property of being 
intelligent, he will be intelligent during any arbitrary stage of his life, and consequently 
also whenever he is playing the piano. McNally ( 1993 , p.570ff.) argues that the 
temporal dependency constraint between the main predicate and depictive is then 
satisfied, albeit in an utterly trivial way, which makes ( 1 8) infelicitous (see also Stump 
1985, Ch.VI .2 .2 . 1 . ) .  In  contrast, the use of the ILPs an immature brat and a strict 
authoritarian in ( 19) is felicitous. ( 19a) conversationally implicates that Boris stopped 
being an immature brat Gust) after he joined the Army, and ( 19b) implicates that Boris 
became a strict authoritarian Gust) before he left the Army. The conversational 
implicature defeats the default inference of persistence associated with ILPs 
(Condoravdi 1 992), and hence the temporal dependency constraint on depictive 
predications is not trivially met. 
( 1 8) ??Fleisher played the piano intelligent. 
( 19) a .  Boris joined the Army an immature brat. 
b .  Boris left the Army a strict authoritarian. 
Following McNally' s  ( 1993) suggestions, I propose that Russian ILPs used as 
depictives are felicitous to the extent that they can be assigned a plausible interpretation 
involving a change with respect to the property they describe (see also Section 3 .2 .4 .  
below).  This interpretation must be overtly encoded by INST on ILP depictives, 
while all AGR-ILPs are systematically excluded as depictives. Examples in (20) 
illustrate these points. The INST-ILP depictive 'well-educated' in (20c) is acceptable, 
as the property of being well-educated must be acquired, but the INST-ILPs 'human 
being' (20a) and ' intelligent' (20b) are not. « 20b,c) are taken from Hinterholz1 2000.) 
(20) a .  Oni vyselP iz komnaty *celoveki / ??celovekomi. 
he.NOM left from room *human.being.NOM / ??human.being.INST 
?? 'He left the room a human being. '  
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b .  Oni vyselP iz universiteta *umDl'Ji 1 ??umnymi. 
he.NOM left from university *intelligent.NOM I ??intelligent.INST 
??'He left the university intelligent. ' 
c .  Oni vyselP iz universiteta *xoroso obrazovannyji 1 x. obrazovannymi. 
he.NOM left from university *well-educated.NOM I well-educated.INST 
'He left the university well-educated. ' 
3.2.2. ILP Depictives and Consequences for the ILP-SLP Distinction 
With respect to Russian INST -marked ILPs I have so far proposed the following: 
Applying the INST case to inherent ILPs does not affect their IL status (Section 2 . 1 . ) ,  
the semantics of INST i s  characterized in terms of the reversal of a truth value of a 
predicate to which INST is applied (14), and INST on ILPs licenses the use of ILPs as 
depictives (Section 3 .2 . 1 . ) .  My proposal converges with independent results of 
McNally ( 1993) and Fernald (1994/2000) with respect to English ILP depictives . We 
agree that a sentence with an ILP depictive is acceptable to the extent that it can be 
assigned a plausible reading that involves a change with respect to the property 
described by the ILP depictive. Nevertheless, interpreting an ILP depictive in this way 
does not mean that it is coerced into a SLP. McNally ( 1 993) justifies her counter­
coercion stance by pointing out that defeating the default inference of temporal 
persistence associated with ILPs by the conversationally implicated change of state 
does not yield interpretations under which ILP depictives necessarily hold temporarily 
(as also suggested by Higginbotham p.c. in McNally 1993),  that is, ILPs do not shift 
into SLPs. Consider ( 19a), for example: Suppose that Boris joined the Army when he 
was eighteen years old. If he stopped being an immature brat some time after joining 
the Army, as is conversationally implicated, then for eighten years at least he was an 
immature brat, which certainly was not a temporary property of Boris. 
According to Fernald ( 199412000, p.3 l ff.) ,  a changed state can be expressed 
by a SLP or an ILP, since stative predicates are SLPs (e.g. , healthy) or ILPs (e.g . ,  an 
immature brat). The change itself can be characterized as a reversal in the truth value 
of a stative proposition, and reversing the truth of a stative proposition does not 
require the IL and SL status of its main predicate to change. Let us take ( 19b) that 
conversationally implicates that Boris underwent a change from the state described by 
...,STRICT AUTHORITARIAN to the state described by STRICT AUTHORITARIAN. Most 
importantly, the reversal of a truth value of the stative ILP STRICT AUTHORITARIAN 
does not affect its IL status. Notice also that Fernald correctly observes that both SLP 
and ILP depictives have the interpretation of the result of a change of state, and not just 
ILP depictives, as McNally ( 1993) argues.  This is also evident from the Russian 
examples discussed so far. However, ILPs do not always have the interpretation of 
the result of a change of state, as ( 19a) or ( 1 5) ,  for example, show, contrary to 
Fernald. 
The claim that ILPs used as depictives retain their inherent IL status has two 
important theoretical implications. First, we must reject the requirement that depictives 
be (interpreted as) SLPs (see Rapoport 199 1 ,  p. 1 66, 1 83 ,  and references therein), and 
similar earlier claims that depictives describe (potentially) transitory properties (see 
Section 1 .) .  Second, the ILP-SLP distinction cannot be a purely temporal distinction. 
This follows assuming that ILPs as depictives involve an interpretation that crucially 
relies on the notion of a 'change' ,  which is an inherently temporal notion. The clearest 
evidence comes from Russian, where this interpretation must be marked with the 
INST case on ILPs. Since INST -ILPs do not generally display distributional 
properties of SLPs, but rather of ILPs, applying INST to ILPs does not coerce ILPs 
into SLPs (see Section 2. 1 . ) .  The semantics of INST is  characterized in terms of a 
reversal in the truth value of a predicate, as I propose in ( 1 4) .  Assuming that the 
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notion of a 'change' can be generally characterized in this way, the inherent IL or SL 
status of a predicate is not affected if it is interpreted as involving a change with respect 
to the property it expresses (see Fernald 1994/2000).  If it is correct that the semantics 
of INST is inherently temporal, because the notion of a 'change' and its formal 
defInition in ( 14) are, and INST occurs on both ILPs and SLPs, then we may 
conclude that the ILP-SLP distinction cannot be purely temporally based. 
This conclusion supports Carlson' s  ( 1977) original view of the ILP-SLP 
distinction as not grounded in temporality. It also contributes to arguments against the 
type-theoretical ILP-SLP distinction, according to which SLPs have a spatio-temporal 
argument in their argument structure, while ILPs do not (see Kratzer 1989, 1 995).  
Moreover, the semantics of the INST case (see ( 14» and the behavior of INST­
marked ILPs can be also viewed as supporting independent proposals that SLPs and 
ILPs have a position for a situation, or spatio-temporal, argument in their argument 
structures (see Parsons 1990, de Swart 1991 1 1993 ,  Chapter 6 . 1 ,  Chierchia 1 995,  
among others; see also related views of En� 1986, Condoravdi 1 992, McNally 1 993 ,  
Musan 199511997, 1999, Larson 1998.) Such proposals also fit well with Rothstein' s  
(2000) constraints on depictives given in ( 1 1 ) .  The advantage of her formulation is 
that she does not specifIcally restrict depictives to SLPs, but requires that a relation be 
established between the main predicate and depictive via their respective situation 
arguments. 
3 .2.3 . ILPs as Inherent Generics 
Following Parsons ( 1990) and others, Chierchia ( 1 995) proposes that all predicates 
have a situation argument, but in ILPs this argument is bound by a generic operator. 
In this sense, ILPs are inherently generic . The meaning of the ILP intelligent is given 
in (21 ) :  
(2 1 )  AX GEN s [IN(x,s)] [intelligent(x,s)] Chierchia 1995 : 199 
It is rendered in the form a tripartite structure, which is independently motivated for the 
quantifIcational structure of sentences (see Carlson and Pelletier 1 995, Krifka et al . 
1995 , Partee 1 991a,b,  1995 , and references therein) . The existence of the generic 
operator GEN is independently motivated for the analysis of generic sentences in Krifka 
et al . ( 1 995) (see also references therein). The restriction on the GEN operator 
' IN(x,s) ' is intended to capture the intuition that the property described by the ILP is 
tendentially stable through time, which in turn triggers a presupposition that there is at 
most one state of the type described by a given ILP whose duration occupies at most 
one signifIcant portion of an individual' s  lifespan (Chierchia 1 995, p.2 1 6) .  (But 
notice that there are ILPs like be famous describing properties that need not occupy 
any portion of an indivi4ual' s  life-time in the ordinary sense.)  The nuclear scope 
consists of the extensional predicate 'intelligent(x,s), that has the type of a two-place 
relation between individuals and situations. Nominal ILPs that function as restrictors 
in quantifIed DPs in argument positions have a variant of the type of a one-place 
predicate, which Chierchia ( 1995) represents as *a:  *teacher = AX GEN s [IN(x,s)] 
[teacher(x,s)] (p.206). A noun with the situation argument cannot occur in argument 
positions, because the situation argument would remain free, and the resulting 
structure would be uninterpretable. Although nouns in argument positions enter in 
temporal relations (see En� 198 1 ,  Musan 1995/1 997, 1999, for example), they cannot 
do so via the situation argument, because it is reserved for binding by tense and A­
quantifIers (in the sense of Partee, Bach and Kratzer 1987). 
Grounding the ILP-SLP distinction in semantics is motivated by its role in 
semantics and syntax, and most prominently by accounts of well-formedness of 
quantifIed sentences, as discussed by de Swart ( 1 9911 1993), Chierchia ( 1 995) and 
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Fernald ( 1994/2000) for example, which speaks against a purely pragmatically-based 
ILP-SLP distinction assumed by Condoravdi ( 1992), and following her suggestions in 
McNally ( 1993), for example. 
3.2.4. The Role of INST in Licensing ILP Depictives in Russian 
Although the analysis of the data explored here could be also cast within other 
frameworks that distinguish ILPs and SLPs in semantic terms, I chose Chierchia' s, 
because it is one of the most recent and best worked out ones. Taking Chierchia's 
( 1995) view of ILPs as inherent generics and Rothstein' s  (2000) analysis of 
depictives, the Russian sentence (2) 'He left the room a murderer' with the ILP 
depictive 'murderer' in the AGR (here NOM) case has the logical representation in 
(22) . Notice that if the main right conjunct is true of some situation S1 in the actual 
world, it will be true of every situation temporally contained in S2. In general, if the 
truth of a generic statement is supported by one situation in a world, it must be 
supported by all (see Kratzer 1 989, 1 995). Therefore, in (2) the ILP-NOM depictive 
'murderer' cannot narrow down in any way the time when he left the room, which 
results in the oddity of (2). 
(22) [= (2)] 3 s3 s 1 3 s2[ [s=SlEes2 A left-the-room(he, S l)] 
A GEN S2 ['t(Sl) :S 't(sJ A IN(he, S2)] [murderer(he, S2)] ] 
(23) [= (2)] 3 s3 s 1 3 s23 s3 [S=SlEes3 A left-the-room (he,sl) A GEN s2[IN(he,s2)] 
[...,murderer(he,s2)] A GEN s3 [IN(he,s3)] [murcierer(he,s3)] 
A BEFORE('t(S2) ' 't(S3» A 't(Sl) :S 't(S3)] 
As a fIrst approximation, the variant of (2) with the ILP depictive 'murderer' in the 
INST case can be represented as in (23) .  (23) is  true in a situation which involves a 
single change of state, which divides the life of the individual into two consecutive 
portions, one in which the state of 'being a murderer' is false (S2) and one in which it 
is true (S3) . The situation S3' the result of a change of state, contains the situation time 
of the main predicate S1 ' left the room' .  The change from S2 to S3 is understood as 
having taken place just before the situation time of the main predicate, which is 
sufficient to narrow down the situation time of the main predicate, and in general to 
guarantee the satisfaction of the temporal dependency constraint on depictives, given in 
( 1 1 a) ,  in a non-trivial way. Consequently, (2)/(23) with the INST-ILP depictive is 
felicitous. This view of ILP depictives is fully compatible with Chierchia' s ( 1995) 
view of ILPs as inherent generics: They trigger a presupposition that there is at most 
one state of the type described by a given ILP, and whose duration occupies at most 
one significant portion of an individual ' s  lifespan, however, not necessarily the whole 
lifespan of an individual. 
In addition to the licensing condition on ILP depictives that is based on a 
conversationally implicated change, as McNally ( 1993) argues,  we also need the 
stronger notion of an entailed change for both Russian and English. In (2)/(23) the 
relevant single change of state is entailed, rather than being conversationally 
implicated. According to native informants, under one of the most salient 
interpretations of (2) with the INST -ILP 'murderer' , (2) cannot be continued with 
something like " . . .  but nothing happened in the room to make him a murderer" without 
a contradiction, even if the individual denoted by the subject argument had (already) 
been a (convicted) murderer once prior to this occasion. A good English example is 
Alicei met the White Rabbit tallj. that is felicitous in the context of Alice in 
Wonderland, for instance, where Alice is always changing her height (see Iackendoff 
1990, p.203). Under this interpretation, continuing the above sentence with " . . .  
because Alice was indeed quite a tall girl, tall with respect to everybody she met and 
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anywhere she went" is at least very odd, if not impossible. This means that the above 
sentence supports the entailment that Alice changes her height before meeting the 
White Rabbit. 
It may also be necessary to relativize the interpretation of ILP depictives, but 
also of SLP depictives, to possible worlds under consideration in discourse. The 
Russian sentence (24) and its English translation, for example, do not conversationally 
implicate that the individual denoted by the subject argument became young just before 
the situation time of the main predicate 'died' or stopped being young just after that 
time. McNally ( 1 993, p.565) concludes that ILP depictives that occur in sentences 
whose main predicates express birth or death are exceptional in this respect. 
(24) Oni pogibP 
he.NOM died 
'He died young. '  
?I* molodoji 1 molodymi 
?1*young.NoM 1 young.INST 
Nichols, 1 98 1 :  264 
At the same time, it does not make much sense to interpret (24) as involving an 
entailment of a change into the state of being young (before or after dying). But then, 
the obligatory use of the INST case on the ILP 'young' is puzzling, and would seem 
to be exceptional on my account, as well. One possible solution would be as follows :  
By stating (24) the speaker asserts that 'he' died young, and conversationally 
implicates that (s)he expected that 'he' would die in some possible world that 
minimally differs from the actual world in at least one respect: namely, that 'he' is not 
young, because he underwent a change with respect to this property. This type of 
meaning is intensional and requires access to possible worlds. 
To summarize, I have so far (tentatively) identifed three types of meanings 
involving the notion of a 'change' that are implicated in the felicitous use of depictives, 
each of which must be overtly marked by the INST case on ILPs and SLPs used as 
depictives in Russian: (i) A predicate entails that the individual it is predicated of 
undergoes a change with respect to the property it describes (ex. (2) and Alice met the 
White Rabbit tall); (ii) a predicate conversationally implicates that the individual it is 
predicated of undergoes a change with respect to the property it describes (ex. ( 15) and 
( 19a,b)) ;  (iii) a predicate conversationally implicates that the individual it is predicated 
of should not have the property described by the INST -predicate in the actual world, 
because it should have undergone a change with respect to this property, but did not 
(ex. (24)). It could also be proposed that (i)-(iii) exhibit a partial ordering according to 
their strengths, with (i) being the strongest and (iii) the weakest. The selection of the 
appropriate meaning in a given context will be determined by a general interpretive 
principle, approximately as follows:  'Choose the strongest meaning that is consistent 
with the sentence-internal, discourse-level linguistic context and with information 
inferred from the general background of an utterance. '  (For a similar rule of 
interpretation see Krifka' s  pragmatic rule ( 1 996, p. 146), and the Strongest Meaning 
Hypothesis proposed for meanings of the reciprocal quantifier by Dalrymple et al. 
( 1994 and 1998). However, the latter is not conceived of as a pragmatic rule of 
interpretation. ) 
In the rest of this paper, I will discuss two other frequent uses of secondary 
predicates in Russian: namely, situation anchors and restrictors in a quantificational 
structure of sentences. The main differences between the two follow from the 
representation of quantificational sentences in terms of a semantic partition into the 
restrictive clause and nuclear scope as well as from Diesing's  ( 1992) Mapping 
Hypothesis: (i) Situation anchors have a conjunctive interpretation with the main clause 
and are mapped into the nuclear scope; (ii) restrictors can be understood as an 
antecedent of an implicit conditional and are mapped into the restrictive clause of an 
explicit operator in the main clause or some implicit operator. 
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3.3. Situation Anchors 
Situation anchors are associated with a presupposition that there is at most one 
situation of the type described by them. Its duration covers at most one salient portion 
of the life-time of an individual denoted by the host argument and includes one or more 
occurrences of the situation described by the main predicate. In the simplest terms, 
and as examples in (2S) show, situation anchors roughly correspond to ordinary 
temporal when-clauses or temporal as-clauses. 
(2S) a .  Ivani odinokiji / odinokimi napisalP lucsie svoi stixi. 
Ivan.NOM alone.NOM / alone.INST wrote best his verses 
'When he was alone, Ivan wrote his best verses. '  
b .  *Rebenoki / rebenkomi oni iill v Moskve. 
child.NOM / child.INST he.NOM lived in Moscow 
'When he was a child, he lived in Moscow. '  
c .  *Celoveki / (?)Celovekomi oni xodill veselyji po ulicam. 
*man.NOM / (?)man.INST he. NOM walked happy.NOM along streets 
(?) 'When he was a human being, he walked along the streets happy. '  
Sentences in (2S) contain no quantificational operator that would induce a semantic 
partition of their content into a restrictive clause and a nuclear scope. Therefore, all the 
material in a sentence is mapped into a single existentially closed nuclear scope (see 
standard Discourse Representation Theory proposals, and also some independently 
made suggestions by Partee 1995, pp.S67-8 . )  To illustrate this point, a sentence like 
(2Sa) with the SLP situation anchor 'alone' will have the simplified logical structure 
given in (26). 
(26) [= (2Sa)] 3s [Ivan was alone in s 1\ Ivan wrote his best verses in s] 
(26) shows that situation anchors have a conjunctive interpretation with the main 
clause. (26) means that Ivan was alone and wrote his best verses .  The existential 
closure quantifier 3 is an unselective operator that ranges over the whole nuclear scope 
and binds all the free occurrences of the situation variable 8. Strictly speaking, this 
guarantees that the situations denoted by the main and secondary predicate occupy 
exactly the same interval. However, the Russian sentence (2Sa) also allows for looser 
interpretations. For example, it is also true if I van' s  writing of his best verses took up 
only a small portion of the whole time of his being alone. This type of reading would 
require some refinement of the logical structure (26). 
As examples (2Sb,c) show, nominal ILPs used as situation anchors require the 
INST case (see also Nichols 198 1 ,  p. ISO, and elsewhere). On my analysis, this 
follows from the semantics of INST -AGR alternation on predicates proposed here (see 
( 10) and ( 14» , and also from Chierchia' s ( 199S) view of ILPs as inherent generics.  
The logical representation of (2Sb) with the ILP in the AGR case, here NOM, can be 
rendered as in (27) :  
(27) [= (2Sb)] 3s2[live-in-Moscow(he,s2) 1\ BEFORE-NOW(S2) 
1\ GEN Sl ['t(S2) � 't(SI) 1\ IN(he ,sl)] [child(he,sl)]] 
Since the situation variable 81 is introduced as an argument of the ILP 'child' , it is 
bound by the generic operator GEN in its lexical representation and inaccessible for 
binding by higher operators. Therefore, existential closure quantifier 3 can only bind 
the situation variable 82 that is introduced as an argument of 'live in Moscow ' .  
Consequently, the situation of the anchor ILP 'child' i s  possibly unrelated to the 
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situation time of the main predicate ' lived in Moscow' :  (27) says that he is a child and 
he lived at some point in the past in Moscow. The anchor ILP-AGR 'child' in (25b) 
does not contribute possibly anything to specifying the time of his living in Moscow, 
and hence (25b) with the ILP-AGR 'child' is ill-formed. 
Intuitively, (25b) would be naturally asserted of somebody who is believed to 
be no longer a child. Notice that this situation matches the conditions for the use of the 
INST case on predicates, as specified in ( 14) .  More precisely, I propose that the 
INST case here sanctions the use of the ILP 'child' as a situation anchor, because it 
triggers a conversational implicature that 'he' underwent a change from being a child to 
not being a child. Thus, the effect of INST on ILPs is to carve some salient portion 
out of the individual's  life-time, and to narrow down the evaluation interval of the ILP. 
This is sufficient to spatio-temporally locate the situation time of the main predicate, 
and hence to guarantee the felicitous use of the whole sentence. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that INST here coerces the ILP 'child' into a SLP, because the predicate 
'child' still behaves like an ILP in the relevant respects: It takes arguments that are of 
the IL sort and describes a disposition for having stage-properties of a certain kind, 
and this disposition is independent of specific situations (or spatio-temporal locations), 
because it holds at any moment during the whole interval of its truth. 
Since SLPs denote sets of temporally and spatially bounded stages of 
individuals (Carlson 1977), for a SLP to be felicitously used as a situation anchor, it 
need not take INST to narrow down the situation described by it to some salient 
portion of an individual' s  life. This may motivate a certain preference for SLPs , 
mainly adjectives, to agree with their controlling argument, as we have already seen in 
(3a) (see also Nichols 198 1 ,  p. 1 50, and elsewhere) . However, an INST may be used 
if the speaker intends to convey that a change with respect to the SL property took 
place before or after the situation time of the main predicate. With ILPs used as 
situation anchors, INST is obligatory, as (25b,c) show. As in other cases when 
INST-marked predicates are used, an INST-ILP used as a situation anchor will be 
felicitous if it can be assigned a plausible interpretation involving a change of state. 
(25c) is infelicitous,  in both its available readings: (i) it is uninformative in its most 
natural interpretation that he is dead now, but he was a human being while he was 
alive; (ii) it is odd if he is still alive but no longer a human being. That (25c) is 
infelicitous follows, given that in the most natural circumstances ILPs like be a human 
being (or have green eyes, be gifted) express states whose duration covers the whole 
life-time of an individual. 
3 .4. Restrictors in a Quantificational Structure of Sentences 
Secondary predicates used as restrictors in quantificational sentences are exemplified in 
sentences in (28) that involve generic quantification over situations. Here, secondary 
predicates, the SLP 'hungry' and the ILP 'teacher' roughly correspond to atemporal 
when-clauses (Carlson 1979), or restrictive iflwhen-clauses (Farkas and Sugioka 
1983), and also to restrictive as-clauses (Katz 1 993) in English. They serve to restrict 
the domain of situations relevant for the evaluation of the main clause to those that 
satisfy the secondary predicate. The function of Russian secondary predicates as 
restrictors has so far gone unnoticed, apart from a few remarks in a recent paper by 
Demjjanow and Strigin (1999). 
(28) a .  *Golodn�ji / golodnymi QIli vozvraScalsja'I 
* hungry .NOM / hungry . INST he returned 
'Whenever he was hungry, he returned home. '  
domoj . 
home 
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(28) b .  *Ucitel'i 1 ucitelemi oni casto bolel!. 
*teacher.NOM 1 teacher.INST he.NOM often be.ill .P AST 
'He was often ill as a teacher if/when he was a teacher. ' I '  As a teacher, .. . '  
Assuming a tripartite structure for the representation of quantificational sentences, a 
simplified logical representation of (28a) can be given as in (29): 
(29) [= (28a)] GEN s [IN(he ,s) A hungry(he,s)] [returned-home(he,s)] 
The main predicate is mapped into a nuclear scope. The adjoined secondary predicate 
is mapped into the restrictive clause of the generic operator GEN, which functions as an 
unselective binder that binds all the free occurrences of the variable s in the formula. 
In evaluating (29), we consider only those situations in which 'he'  is hungry in 
determining whether 'he' returned home. (29) expresses that some proportion of 
situations in which he is hungry are situations in which he returned home. 
At the outset it was observed that SLPs and ILPs that function as restrictors of 
quantifiers are constrained to occur in the INST case. (28a,b) follow this pattern, as 
well. The line of reasoning for motivating the obligatory INST case here is essentially 
the same as proposed for INST-SLP depictives in generic sentences (see ex. ( 17)): 
AGR-predicates are excluded here, because their denotation domain is non-atomic, and 
therefore they cannot directly serve to form the basis of quantification for generic 
quantifiers. In (28a), the INST case together with the implicit generic quantifier 
induce a type of 'intermittent' or 'interruptive' reading of the INST-marked SLP, and 
consequently also the requisite multiplicity of discrete (atomic) situations to be 
quantified over by the generic quantifier. 
While with INST-marked SLPs this type of 'intermittent' reading is 
unproblematic, with INST -marked ILPs, as in (28b), it poses quite a few puzzles .  
The generic quantifier GEN here ranges over separate situations in which he is a 
teacher, and the sentence expresses that some proportion of these situations are 
situations in which he was often ill. A similar type of 'intermittent' reading of ILPs 
can be also found in combinations of ILPs with quantificational adverbs in English, as 
in (30) discussed by Fernald ( 199412000), for example: 
(30) a. Max is sometimes a California resident. b .  Francis is occasionally blond. 
Following Carlson' s  ( 1977) approach, Fernald (199412000) convincingly argues that 
this type of an 'intermittent' reading of ILPs is not a matter of coercion into SL 
interpretations, because the predicates California resident and blond here take 
arguments that are of the individual sort. Similarly, in Russian, ILPs in the INST case 
that are used as restrictors in generic sentences like (28b) retain their IL status,  
although they are used with apparently SL interpretations. Here, the property of being 
a teacher in a given situation is a property of the IL sort. Although it does not apply to 
the whole or even most of the individual' s  life-time, it is not restricted to a specific 
stage of the individual in so far as it is still independent of specific temporal and spatial 
locations. Therefore, INST is best not to be treated in terms of a semantic function 
that maps ILPs into SLPs by removing, for example, the GEN operator binding the 
situation variable in the semantic representation of ILPs . This sheds doubts on a 
proposal along these lines made by Katz ( 1993) for ILPs that occur in generic as­
clauses like As an advisor, Gloria is reliable. As is here interpreted as a function that 
takes a generic property P and returns the SL correlate of P. 
If it is correct that ILPs form the restrictive clause in sentential quantification 
over situations, then we face two main problems: One concerns the denotation of ILPs 
in this function, and the other the expression of quantification in relation to 
quantificational ontology. First, on Chierchia' s view of ILPs as generics (as on most 
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other current views of ILPs) , sentences like (28b) would be ruled out as 
ungrammatical. This follows given that the generic quantifier GEN binds the situation 
variable of ILPs (see (21 )), and therefore makes it unavailable for binding by higher 
operators. This also means that quantifiers that have ILPs as restrictors can only bind 
their individual variables, as in Oranges are often sweet. However, this view of ILPs 
turns out to be too restrictive, and needs to be modified. Not all ILPs are associated 
with the presupposition that there is at most one state of the type described by a given 
ILP, and whose duration occupies at most one significant portion of an individual' s  
life-time, as Chierchia ( 1995, p.2 16) states it, and also similarly de Swart ( 1 99 1/1993, 
p.65) in her uniqueness presupposition on the Davidsonian argument. There is also a 
significant number of ILPs describing states that may occupy more than one significant 
portion of an individual' s life-time. Examples include nominal ILPs that describe 
occupations like teacher, director, jockey, social positions, status including 
distinctions like gold medallist, kinship terms like husband, or residency and 
citizenship like California resident andGerman citizen. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that we find nominal ILPs of this type with an 'intermittent' or 'interruptive' reading, 
as in (30), or in (28b), where they are used as restrictors in sentential quantification 
over situations. In short, we need to formulate an adequate denotation for such ILPs 
that captures their IL status (by keeping Chierchia' s  insight that they are inherently 
generic, for example) as well as the observation that they may exhibit an 'interruptive' 
reading, when used as restrictors, for example. Such ILPs need to be distinguished 
from other types of ILPs that satisfy de Swart' s and Chierchia' s uniqueness 
presupposition on the situation argument, and therefore block quantification over 
situations. These include ILPs like be a human being, have green eyes and be gifted 
that express states whose duration covers the individual ' s  life-time; child, adult, 
young, old that describe 'once-only' maturation stages of individuals; or be a great 
poet that expresses a property that may extend beyond the life-time of an individual. 
Finding the appropriate denotation(s) for ILPs that would cover all their different types 
and uses must remain a topic for future research. 
Second, Partee ( 199 l a) proposes that D-quantifiers (mainly 'determiner' 
quantifiers) tend to range over individuals, while A-quantifiers (including adverbial 
quantifiers and the generic GEN often range over events or situations. ('D­
quantification' and 'A-quantification' are here used in the sense introduced by Partee, 
Bach and Kratzer 1 987.)  However, adverbial quantifiers can quantify over 
individuals, when they are combined with ILPs, as in Oranges are often sweet (see 
Lewis 1975, Heim 1982, Partee 199 1a,b; specifically for generic quantifiers see Filip 
1994, Dobrovie-Sorin 2000). However, (28b) does not fit such typical patterns: 
Here, we have the generic quantifier GEN, an A-quantifier, whose restriction is formed 
with the ILP 'teacher' , and yet the quantification does not concern individuals, that i s ,  
a set of teachers, but rather a set of  individual situations in  which it i s  true of  a single 
individual that he is a teacher. Given that A-quantifiers constitute a large and 
heteregeneous class with respect to their formal expression, potential to function as 
selective or unselective binders, it may not be surprising that they also differ from one 
another with respect to their range and how what they quantify over is determined (see 
Partee 1991b,  1995). Among the factors that are implicated here are the overt phrase 
structure, the topic/focus structure, the presence of an ILP or a SLP in their restrictive 
clause, and we may also add the type of an ILP in the restriction (see the previous 
paragraph).  This situation also points to the question about the systematic division of 
A-quantifiers along such parameters, already posed by Partee ( 199 1 a,b, 1 995). As far 
as the future research is concerned, we also need to specify the conditions under which 
ILPs are used with A-quantifiers to express quantification over situations, and in the 
light of such data rethink the relation between the expression of quantification and 
quantificational ontology. 
THE SEMANTICS OF CASE IN RUSSIAN SECONDARY PREDICATION 
4. Conclusions 
The INST -AGR alternation explored here provides new evidence in support of 
Carlson' s  ( 1977) original view that the ILP-SLP distinction is not based in 
temporality, and in support of adding a situation argument, or a spatio-temporal 
argument, to every predicate, as Parsons ( 1990) proposes. I argued that Russian 
predicative nouns and other inherent ILPs retain their IL status,  regardless in which 
case they are realized, and even if they obligatorily occur in the INST case with 
apparently SL interpretations: namely, when used in secondary predications as 
depictives, situation anchors, and restrictors in sentences expressing quantification 
over situations. The semantics of the INST case, the marked case in the INST -AGR 
alternation, is crucial in licensing ILPs as secondary predicates .  It expresses the 
meaning of a 'change' with respect to the property described by a predicate to which it 
is applied. This has the effect of (i) narrowing down the evaluation times of INST­
marked ILPs, which guarantees the felicitous use of ILPs as depictives and situation 
anchors, or of (ii) generating an 'interruptive ' interpretation of INST-marked ILPs, 
and, therefore also a multiplicity of situations to quantity over by some quantificational 
operator. 
' 
Among the many topics for future research, apart from those already 
mentioned, let me briefly mention the following three: First, the behavior of secondary 
predicates under negation. Only depictives may fall within the scope of negation of the 
main verb, while situation anchors and restrictors never do. For restrictors and 
depictives this difference directly follows from my analysis :  The semantic content of 
restrictors is presupposed, and therefore it does not fall into the scope of negation, 
while the semantic content of depictives is not, and hence may be caught up under the 
scope of negation (depending on the focus structure). Second, the syntactic and 
semantic motivation for the co-occurrence constraints on different types of secondary 
predicates .  Since depictives can co-occur with situation anchors and restrictors, they 
are clearly independent of both types of predicates, while situation anchors and 
restrictors are in complementary distribution. Third, the role of morphological case as 
a formal and semantic licenser of secondary predicates, and ILPs in particular. One 
question here regards the similarities and differences in licensing of secondary 
predicates by morphological case systems (see Rapoport 1 991  on Warlpiri, for 
example). 
Endnotes 
* I would like to thank Gregory Carlson, Chris Kennedy, Amim von Stechow, and 
audiences at the workshop on Predicative Constructions at Zentrum fUr Allgemeine 
Sprachwissenschaft in Berlin (Germany),  colloquia at Northwestern University, the 
University of Chicago, the University of Tiibingen, and at the conference on Formal 
Approaches to Slavic Linguistics at the University of Michigan. 
1 .  See Nichols ( 1 98 1 )  and Timberlake ( 1982), for example. 
2. Timberlake ( 1982, p. 329) observes that AGR (nominative case in his examples) on 
a depictive is used in 77% (23/30) of the examples with a perfective main verb he 
collected. 
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